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Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism, and the
Rule of Law in Zambia: 
From a Justice System to a Just System
Muna Ndulo
Cornell Law School, Cornell University, USA
In Zambia it is generally agreed on by all stakeholders that the judicial system
needs reform to make it more accountable, independent, and able to deliver
justice efficiently and effectively. This article discusses judicial reform in the context
of the independence of the judiciary. It tries to unpack the term judicial reform. It
argues that for the rule of law and constitutionalism to prevail it is crucial that the
judiciary is independent and there is separation of powers between the executive
and the judiciary, and legislature and the judiciary. For judges to be personally
and substantively independent they need security of tenure, and an appointment
system that is transparent, takes merit and competence seriously and minimizes
political influence in the appointments. While judges need to be accountable for
their judgments there is need to guard against those who interpret accountability
as getting judges who will deliver desired outcomes in judgments.
1. Introduction
I want to share with you my thoughts on judicial reform and the legal profession
in Zambia. I am aware that I am offering these remarks against the background
of an intense debate underway in the country about judicial reform and the state
of our judiciary. The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) has raised the need to
reform the Zambian judiciary, and has argued that the judiciary in Zambia is
inefficient, corrupt and has lost its sense of accountability to society. The
Association has stated: 
While we are strong proponents of judicial independence, we are
equally stronger proponents of judicial accountability. Judicial
independence and judicial accountability are not inconsistent and
can therefore coexist. The judiciary should not be ungovernable and
elitist or untouchable. The old days of respectful deference and
fearful silence have gone forever (LAZ, 2012).
To ordinary Zambians, the issues of delay, expense and corruption are the
most worrisome. For lawyers, there is concern about competence, lack of
independence and lack of accountability. In addition, there are a number of
problematic issues with respect to the operations of the courts that tend to
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undermine the integrity of the judicial system and the confidence of the people in
the judiciary. For example, the lack of an objective system for allocating cases to
judges encourages “judge shopping” and the perception of corruption. There are
also inordinate delays in the determination of litigation by courts. At the High Court
level, the process and reasons why some cases are heard by three judges and
others by one has never been explained or rationalized by objective criteria. 
As we discuss reform, we must be mindful of the fact that the judiciary does
not operate in isolation; it is afflicted by the same objective conditions that
undermine other Zambian institutions. It would be wrong to assume that the
country, apart from the judiciary, is run by a competent executive and
parliamentary branch. Indeed, meaningful reform in Zambia should encompass
the whole system of governance: we need a comprehensive plan rather than
piecemeal actions. Reform should be aimed at transforming society and the way
we conduct matters of politics and the economy. Importantly, in order to strengthen
our institutions, we must depersonalize them.
That said, a word of caution: reform should not proceed on the assumption
that there is nothing of value in the current judicial system. Over the years, we
have created working institutions and have gained valuable experience. We have
evolved as a democratic society.  What is required now is reforming and improving
what is already in place -- not wholesale replacement. We are not in a revolution. 
A first step is to define the goals of reform and the methodology to be used to
achieve it. It is important to be mindful of the fact that reform does not mean the
same thing to all people; there always will be people with their own agendas that
often attempt to hijack genuine reform processes. It is therefore necessary to clarify
to all stakeholders what is meant by reform. As regards judicial reform, judicial
accountability is properly understood as a fundamental democratic requirement.
Put simply, it means that judges must be accountable to the public for their
constitutional role of applying the law fairly and impartially. Unfortunately, as Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor of the USA has pointed out, “judicial accountability, however,
is a concept that is frequently misunderstood at best and abused at worst”
(O’Connor, 2008:1). Experience shows that “judicial accountability” sometimes
becomes a rallying cry for those who want to dictate substantive judicial outcomes.
Such a warped representation of what is meant by accountability ignores the role
of the judiciary and, indeed, the very structure of a democratic government based
on the separation of powers, the rule of law and constitutionalism. 
With this in mind, and mindful of the context of Zambia’s current reform
debate, I would like to address several interrelated issues: (a) the rule of law and
democratic governance; (b) judicial independence; (c) appointment of judges and
tenure (d) competence; (e) the judiciary and non-judicial functions; (f) magistrates;
(g) representation in the judiciary; (h) financial autonomy; (i) the status of the
judiciary; (j) effectiveness of the judiciary; and (k) the criticism of judges and
contempt of court. 
The Law Association, as reflected in a letter to the Minister of Justice dated
11 January 2012, demands that we – at the very least – open a conversation on
Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: 
From a Justice System to a Just System
2
zambia journal edition 3_Layout 1  19/11/2012  20:43  Page 2
issues of corruption, independence, appointment of judges, competence and
delays in the delivery of justice. The alleged decay and decline in public
confidence in the judicial system, an institution we have all sworn to defend and
promote, should be of concern to all of us and should prompt us to seek to redress
the situation. A cardinal principle of justice is that no judge, no lawyer and no
citizen should be above the law, let alone be beyond the law. The judiciary in any
country is central to the protection of the rule of law and the protection of human
rights and freedoms. It is also an essential check and balance on the other
branches of government, ensuring that laws of Parliament and acts of the
executive comply with the constitution and the rule of law. Over one hundred years
ago, Alfred Deakin, Australia’s first Attorney-General, described the courts as
being the final authority on the interpretation of the constitution. He noted that the
Australian High Court was to be given “a most potent voice.” It was to determine
the powers of the Commonwealth, the powers of the states, and the validity of the
legislation (Ponnambalam, 1998: 38). Emphasizing the role that courts play in the
protection of rights and the delivery of justice in any society, Justice Lewis Powell
of the United States Supreme Court observed: 
Equal justice under the law is not merely a caption on the façade of the
Supreme Court Building; it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our
society. It is one of the ends for which our entire legal system existed.
It is fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance and
availability, without regard to economic status (Powell Jr., 1965).
Only a judiciary that has integrity and is competent, independent, and efficient
can protect the rights of citizens and deliver equal justice. It is, therefore,
imperative that we look at the factors that can help ensure that competence,
integrity and efficiency are the hallmark of a judicial system. We must remember
that, as Reginald Smith observed: “without equal access to the law, the system not
only robs the poor of their only protection, but it places in the hands of their
oppressors the most powerful and ruthless weapon ever created” (Smith, 1919).
2. Rule of Law and Democratic Governance
As the “rule of law” is one of the most important political and legal conceptions in
democratic governance, it is important to begin our conversation with an
examination of the concept: What does “rule of law” mean? To some, the rule of
law calls for the elimination of wide discretionary authority from government
processes. To others, the rule of law means the existence of formal rules which do
not discriminate between citizens and to still others it means due process of law.
The concept assumes the existence of inalienable rights and liberties which
government should not touch or violate. Predominant among such rights are
property rights, the right to free expression, freedom of association, equality before
the law, due process and protection against discrimination. To some extent, the
essence of the rule of law lies in its juxtaposition to the “rule of men.” It is
comprised of the following basic principles: that all state power ought to be
exercised under the authority of laws, and that there should be rules of law
Muna Ndulo
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governing the election and appointment of those who make and execute policy, as
well as the manner in which policies are made and executed. It demands that
policies be executed in such a way as to ensure rationality and fairness. The rule
of law connotes the use of state power, through rules of law for the establishment
of the economic and social system agreed upon by the people via constitutionally
sanctioned representative institutions or other acceptable surrogates. It calls for
governance in accordance with the constitution. All power, whether of Parliament,
the executive or the courts, must be exercised in accordance with the constitution,
which is the final word on the powers and roles of each branch.
Constitutionalism as an element of the rule of law largely depends on how
constitutional limitations imposed on government are interpreted and enforced.
Integral to the rule of law and constitutionalism is the doctrine of the separation of
powers, which I will come back to. As Nwabueze has observed: “Liberty implies
the limitation of power by law and the one institution above all others essential to
the preservation of the rule of law has always been and still is an honest, able,
learned, and independent judiciary” (Nwabueze, 1993:189).
The maintenance of an independent and accountable judiciary is fundamental
to constitutionalism and the protection of human rights. The worldwide emergence
of constitutions with wide-ranging and justiciable Bills of Rights has rekindled
public awareness and interest in the role of courts as a forum through which to
seek individual and collective justice and the sustenance of a democratic culture. 
In democratic states, courts are asked to review government’s acts for
compliance with the Bill of Rights. An independent body’s review of governmental
acts – in the interests of maintaining the efficacy of the constitutional guarantee of
individual rights – is an essential and important mechanism of democratic
governance. Moreover, such a review being at the instance of an individual assures
personal participation in government. In the famous case of Marbury v. Madison,
Chief Justice Marshall of the USA observed: “It is emphatically the province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule of
particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret the law. A law repugnant
to the constitution is void. Courts as well as other departments are bound by that
instrument.”1 The courts are the guardians of fundamental rights and provide a
forum for public debate so that the exercise of public power by democratically
elected persons remains accountable. Judges’ interpretations of the constitution
and other laws support the rule of law, not executive whims; and judicial review
permits courts to declare as invalid law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
constitution. Only an independent judiciary can effectively review governmental
acts and ensure the constitutional guarantee of human rights. 
Equally, the executive must support the independence of the judiciary. About
a year after Nelson Mandela became President, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa heard an urgent application (The Executive Council of Western Cape
Legislature and Others v. President of South Africa and Others, Constitutional
Court of South Africa, 1995)2 challenging legislation that purported to confer
powers on the President to legislate, which President Mandela did by way of
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proclamations. The proclamations dealt with the vital local government elections
that were soon to be held. An application was brought on the basis that the
legislature may not empower the President to legislate and, to the extent that the
President purported to do so, he acted in conflict with the constitution. Mr. Mandela
was named as one of the respondents. The challenge was successful. The court
held that the provision purporting to empower the President to enact legislation
was inconsistent with the constitution; enacting legislation was a function of
Parliament and not within the President’s powers. The court came to this
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that all political parties had agreed that the
President should have the power to do what he did. In a remarkable display of
leadership, the same day of the court’s decision, Mr. Mandela rushed to the
television and radio stations and declared that, while he had signed the
proclamation believing that he had the power to do so, he respected the decision
of the Constitutional court and appealed to all concerned to similarly accept the
court’s decision. As George Bizos has lamented: “What a pity that many African
leaders do not follow this example” (Bizos, 2011).
Some would argue that the power vested in the judiciary to set aside the laws
made by a legislature constitutes a subversion of democracy. In response, I would
draw upon the words of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case
involving a challenge to the Presidential appointment of Simelane as head of the
South African National Prosecution Authority – Democratic Alliance V. The
President of South Africa and Others,3 (which in turn quoted former Chief Justice
Mahomed’s words to the International Commission of Jurists): 
That argument is, I think, based on a demonstrable fallacy. The
legislature has no mandate to make a law which transgresses the
powers vesting in it in terms of the constitution. Its mandate is to
make only those laws permitted by the constitution and to defer to the
judgment of the court, any conflict generated by an enactment
challenged on constitutional grounds. If it does make laws which
transgress its constitutional mandate or if it refuses to defer to the
judgment of the court on any challenge to such laws, it is in breach
of its own mandate. The court has a constitutional right and duty to
say so and it protects the very essence of a constitutional democracy
when it does. A democratic legislature does not have the option to
ignore, defy or subvert the court.4
The same observations are valid for the executive branch. It too lacks a
mandate beyond that which is granted to it by the constitution. The executive can
only do what it is authorized by the constitution to do. The determination of
whether an executive action is constitutional is a judicial matter – in other words,
it is a matter constitutionally left to the courts to decide. Executive actions are,
therefore, properly subject to judicial review to determine their compliance with
the constitution. This process of checks and balances among the branches of
government supports the rule of law and democratic governance. 
Muna Ndulo
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3. Judicial Independence
It is beyond dispute that to sustain a democracy in the modern world, an
independent, impartial and upright judiciary is an absolute necessity. Therefore,
the constitution, laws and policies of a country must ensure that the justice system
is truly independent from other branches of the state. Judicial independence is
recognized in many international and regional human rights instruments5 as one
of the cornerstones of good governance.6 The principle is also enshrined in all
democratic constitutions.7 It involves two tenets; (a) judicial power must exist as
a power separate from and independent of, executive and legislative power and
(b) judicial power must repose in the judiciary as a separate organ of government,
composed of persons different from and independent of those who compose the
executive and legislature.  
As the United States Supreme Court observed in O’ Donoghue v. United
States:
If it be important to separate the several departments of government
and restrict them to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows as
a logical corollary, equally important, that each department should be
kept completely independent of the others - independent not in the
sense that they shall not co-operate to the common end of carrying into
effect the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of
each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to,
the coercive influence of either of the other department.8
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers has underscored the importance of the separation of powers and stated
that: “The principle of the separation of powers is the bedrock upon which the
requirement of judicial independence and impartiality are founded” (International
Commission of Jurists, 2004: 1).9 The principle was further underscored in the
South African constitutional Court judgment S. v. Mamabolo10 (E.T.V. and others
intervening, 2001). In the words of Justice Krigler: “In our constitutional order the
judiciary is an independent pillar of the state, constitutionally mandated to exercise
the judicial authority of the state fearlessly and impartially under the doctrine of the
separation of powers. It stands on an equal footing with the executive and
legislature as pillars of the state.”11
As Sandra Day O’Connor has similarly observed: “Judicial independence is
the vital mechanism that empowers judges to make decisions that may be
unpopular but none the less correct” (O’Connor, 2008). In so doing, the judiciary
vindicates the principle that no person, or group, however powerful, is above the
law. And it gives life to the promise that the rule of law safeguards the minority from
the tyranny of the majority (O’Connor, 2008). As discussed further below, judicial
independence rests on the pillars of institutional and financial autonomy. These
pillars encompass the need for an appropriate appointment procedure, security of
tenure, satisfactory conditions of service that the executive cannot adversely
affect, the provision of adequate financial resources, and appropriate terms and
conditions for all those involved in the administration of justice. These elements,
Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: 
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in turn, are founded on the principle that the exercise of judicial functions is vested
solely in the judiciary.12 Whilst discussion of the independence of the judiciary in
rule of law discourse often centres on protecting and promoting the rights of judges
in the higher courts, we must also recognize that magistrates require comparable
protection, not least because it is they who deal with the vast majority of cases,
both criminal and civil, and it is upon them that much of the public confidence in
the legal system resides.
An independent judiciary requires both that individual judges are independent
in the exercise of their powers, and that the judiciary as a whole is independent
from wrongful interference by the other branches of government. As to the
independence of individual judges, there are at least two avenues for securing
that independence. First, judges must be protected from the threat of reprisals, so
that fear does not direct their decision-making. Second, the method by which
judges are selected, and the ethical principles imposed upon them, must be
constructed so as to minimize the risk of corruption and outside influence. Thus,
the first endeavor is to protect judicial independence from outside threats, and the
second is to ensure that judicial authority is not abused and it is the core concern
of judicial accountability. To permit judges to be independent means that they must
be left alone by the other judges, including the Chief Justice, to make their own
decisions. Should superior judges disagree with a lower court’s judgment, the
appeal process enables the superior courts to have a bite at the case.  
Yet independence comes at a price. In Zambia this is quite evident in the
number of able lawyers who have been bypassed for appointments to the bench
solely because they are perceived by “the powers that be” as unfriendly to
government. In spite of such challenges, judges and magistrates must recognize
that they are duty bound to provide society with the highest possible standards of
service and commitment, and that a failure to maintain this is rightly a matter of
public concern. That means the judiciary and judges must be accountable.
Independence does not mean that judges can decide cases according to their
personal preference. To the contrary, judges have a right and duty to decide cases
before them according to the law, free from fear of reprisals of any kind. The United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights in article 9 recognizes that “everyone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him.”14 (United Nations, 1948: Article 9) But as Cartwright
observes: “What ultimately protects the independence of the judiciary is a
community consensus that such independence is a quality worth protecting”
(Cartwright, 1998: 39).
It is sometimes alleged that calls for accountability are designed to weaken
the independence of the judiciary. These are legitimate concerns that need to be
addressed. There are sound ways to achieve judicial accountability while
safeguarding the role of the courts, consistent with the larger role of the judiciary
in our democratic society. Judicial accountability advances judicial independence
and the rule of law. Accountability and independence are two sides of the same
Muna Ndulo
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coin: accountability ensures that judges perform their constitutional role, and
judicial independence protects judges from pressures that would pull them out of
that role. Indeed, as Kourlis and Singer suggested: “The enterprise of
accountability for fair and efficient processes may help stave off irresponsible
demands for accountability for decisional outcomes” (Kourlis and Singer, 2008).
True judicial accountability furthers judicial integrity. An independent and
honourable judiciary is indispensable to the rule of law. If judges are to be the
independent guarantors of the rule of law values, they must be incorruptible.
Judges are entrusted with ultimate decisions over the life, freedoms, duties, rights,
and property of citizens. Judges will never win the respect and trust of citizens if
they are subject to corrupt influences. Whenever a judge makes a decision for
personal gain, or to curry favour, or to avoid censure, that judge and that act
denigrates the rule of law. Further, judicial accountability advances judicial
competence. A fundamental value of the rule of law is that judicial decisions are
not made arbitrarily, but through a process of reasoned decision making. The rule
of law requires that decisions be justified in law, and therefore be reasoned,
analytical, rational and non-arbitrary with respect to general legal standards.
Independence, integrity and competence, then, are the hallmarks of a judiciary
committed to upholding the rule of law and they are the principles to which a
judiciary should be held accountable.
4. The Appointment of Judges and Tenure 
In order to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, best
constitutional practices and international law require states to appoint judges
through strict selection criteria and in a transparent manner. Unless judges are
appointed and promoted on the basis of their legal skills, the judiciary runs the
risk of not complying with its core function: imparting justice independently and
impartially. 
Judicial Service Commissions (JSC) remain responsible for overseeing
judicial appointments in most African countries, although there remain significant
divergences of opinion as to their composition. With one exception, all are chaired
by the Chief Justice. As head of the judiciary, this is entirely appropriate. But where
the Chief Justice is appointed by the President, the issue of possible excessive
Presidential influence in the appointment of the judges arises. The concern is a
real one although, arguably, the matter is best dealt with by providing a suitably
independent and transparent appointment system for the Chief Justice. The
involvement of other senior judicial figures in the appointment process is also
commonplace and necessary, for their experience together with their personal
knowledge of potential candidates makes them well qualified to identify suitable
individuals for appointment or advancement. Even so, the Presidential influence
as to the choice of the JSC’s judicial members is a cause of concern in many
jurisdictions.15 The point here is that it is not sufficient for the executive to say “Oh,
we never dictate to the judges how to decide individual cases” when more potent
but subtle pressures can be exercised on the judiciary to make it conform to the
Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: 
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wishes of the executive. The awarding of contracts is one such powerful incentive
that should have no place in an independent judiciary. Having judges on contract
is unacceptable. It has a serious detrimental impact on citizens’ right to proper
justice and on the judges’ right to stability in their positions as a guarantee of
judicial independence and autonomy. 
Limiting membership of a JSC to the senior judiciary is now outdated and yet
many countries continue the model. Fears that ‘outsiders’ may seek to unduly
influence judicial appointments (or removal) for political or other improper motives
are understandable and must be addressed. However, without a more
representative membership, appointments may be (or may be perceived as being)
part of an ‘old boys’ network’ designed to maintain the status quo and which
imports potential bias (unconscious or otherwise) towards particular individuals,
political parties or ethnic groups. In addition, there are sometimes fears that
members of the senior executive are elitist and do not necessarily represent or
understand the views of the wider community.16 These are real concerns and
provide strong support for opening up the membership of a JSC to others who
have a legitimate interest in, and expectation of, involvement in judicial
appointments and removals.
It is certainly desirable to include members from the wider legal community
for they can offer peer assessment on fitness for office and can also identify
candidates who might otherwise be overlooked through the official channels
because of, for example, their perceived anti-government attitudes. Representation
by practitioners and law teachers designated by their peers is desirable.17 Law
teachers are often in an excellent position to evaluate the academic capabilities
of prospective appointees.18 In addition, this provides an important link between
the profession and law teachers. Government representation in the appointment
process is also legitimate and is often provided for by the Attorney-General’s
inclusion as ex officio.19
Opening the commission to lay members is a feature in both South Africa and
Uganda. A lay presence is often justified on the grounds that the public and their
elected representatives have a legitimate interest in the matter and can make it
more difficult for political influence to sway appointments. Whilst these are valid
considerations, it is still hard to justify the presence of such persons unless they
also bring to the commission some specific expertise or experience that is
otherwise lacking. It is certainly vital that judges enjoy a significant input in the
selection and removal process, but the objective must be to provide for a
demonstrably independent body whose membership comprises the necessary
range of expertise and experience with which to assess the quality and
competence of candidates.
Even with a suitably constituted JSC, there remains the question of its role
in the appointment process itself.20 Many African constitutions provide that the
President must appoint “after consultation with the JSC.” This is the weakest
formulation, for the President is not bound by the Commission’s views.21 A
stronger approach is one that requires the President to act “on the advice of”
Muna Ndulo
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or “on the recommendation of” the JSC. This is the approach in the new Kenya
constitution adopted in 2010. This approach implies that the appointment by
the President is a purely formal function. It may be argued, however, that the
head of government does have a legitimate right to more than just a formal role
in appointments. A possible solution here is for the JSC to provide a shortlist of
appointable candidates from which the head of government can select his/her
preferred candidate(s),22 with the President not being allowed to deviate from
this list. The process for appointments to judicial bodies should be transparent
and accountable, and the establishment of an independent body for this
purpose is encouraged. Any method of judicial selection should safeguard the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The Universal Charter of the
Judges in article 9, states that: “the selection and appointment of a judge must
be carried out according to objective and transparent criteria based on proper
professional qualifications.”23 Whichever approach is adopted, it is essential
that candidates for judicial appointment are professionally competent persons
of proven integrity who enjoy the confidence of both the governors and
governed alike.
A different type of safeguard adopted in some African countries is a
requirement that the appointments of High Court and apex court judges be subject
to ratification by the legislature.24 For this requirement to be meaningful, however,
requires that the ratification process be properly structured, preferably with the
matter being considered by a fully representative and suitably qualified
Parliamentary Committee. In the United States, where this system is widely
practiced in most senior appointments, Senate Committees are charged with the
task of examining nominated candidates in a transparent manner. However, given
the ongoing weakness of many African legislatures, the attempt to incorporate
elements of legislative ratification into the appointment system is more likely than
not to have the effect of politicizing appointments (e.g., voting simply along party
lines) rather than providing for an independent assessment as to the suitability of
nominees.25 In Zambia, Parliamentary Ratification has turned out to be no more
than getting a security clearance from the security services and Anti-Corruption
commission; the structure fails to serve as a test of competence.  
Security of tenure is key to judicial independence and explains the importance
of maintaining judges on permanent appointment and prohibiting the abolition of
their tenure of office without their consent.26 Lack of tenure breeds insecurity and
can only lead to compliant judgments. In some jurisdictions, the executive has
discretion to extend a judge’s term of office. Where such discretion is unlimited, it
undermines the independence of the judiciary, for it is likely that only those that the
executive considers “good judges” will receive extensions. In order to close this
conduit of executive influence over the judiciary, many jurisdictions provide for a
compulsory retirement age with no exceptions. A judge who reaches retirement
age should remain in office beyond the retirement age only to complete
proceedings commenced before the attainment of retirement age. 
Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: 
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5. Competence of the Judiciary
Throughout the centuries, common law jurisprudence on which Zambian law is
founded has relied on the judiciary to move the law forward and keep it relevant
to the needs of contemporary society. Many of our most fundamental principles
and liberties are founded directly upon judicial decisions. One of the perceived
shortcomings of the Zambian judiciary has been the alleged lack of knowledge
and competence in the law.  
The duty of judges is to apply the law and develop it through the use of
precedent. The appellate courts’ focus on determinations of law (versus facts)
should allow appellate judges in particular to develop the law to meet the changing
needs of society. Law cannot stand still; to do so would fail to meet the ever-
changing needs of society. 
To develop the law a judge must possess good knowledge of the law and a
sufficiently high intellect so that he or she can quickly understand not only intricate
matters of evidence, but also principles of other relevant sources of knowledge.
Although Zambia has some great judges, on the whole, the average Zambian
judge seems unable to develop the law, and instead retreats into a mechanical
application of precedent to the facts before him or her. One of the factors that
contribute to this situation is the fact that Zambian judges are largely drawn from
the magistracy. The key qualification to serve as a judge has typically been seven
years of service as a lawyer or magistrate - irrespective of the quality and manner
of service. Sadly, academic intellect has never been a significant criterion. In
contrast, a well-qualified judiciary would comprise a mixture of accomplished
academics, practitioners and persons drawn from the magistracy. It is therefore
not surprising that while judgments from countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana
and South Africa have made a major contribution to international jurisprudence,
one is hard pressed to find a Zambian judgment that has contributed to world
jurisprudence.
It is important to note that Zambia’s hurdles to achieving a highly capable
judiciary are made steeper by our lack of a well-structured continuing legal
education programme through which Zambian lawyers can avail themselves of
the opportunity to learn and improve lawyering and professional skills. It should not
go unnoticed that developing and maintaining highly competent judicial ranks also
requires providing skills and development opportunities for the legal community,
especially those serving or hoping to serve as magistrates or judges.  
6. The Judiciary and Non-Judicial Functions 
The use of senior judges to head Presidential or Governmental commissions of
inquiry and the like is relatively common in Africa. In my view, judges should not
agree to head (or be a member of) a commission in circumstances that affect, or
many be seen to affect, the independence of the judiciary or which could
undermine the separation of powers.27 Unfortunately, there have been cases
where judges have accepted positions leading commissions which adversely
impact the independence of the judiciary. Further, where a judge of the High Court
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or even of the Supreme Court is sitting as the sole member or chair of a tribunal,
he or she effectively becomes an inferior court insofar as the judge is now
amenable to discipline through an order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition.
This is exactly what happened in the case of Justice Chirwa in the Dora Siliya
inquiry (2010). Zambia has a large number of persons who have held, but have
retired from high judicial posts. There is no reason why these persons should not
be called upon to head and participate in commissions of inquiries. It would be in
the best interest of the country if the members of commissions of inquiry and any
similar bodies were not chosen from the ranks of the judiciary. 
7. Magistrates
In Africa, magistrates are often the “forgotten” persons in discussions on judicial
independence and judicial reform. This is most unfortunate, for they play a crucial
role in the entire judicial system given that they hear the vast majority of criminal
cases and make other key decisions such as the granting of bail to criminal
suspects. Magistrates’ courts are also the places where the most impoverished,
powerless and defenceless in society often come. If citizens have no confidence
in magistrates and their court officials, perceiving them to be pro-executive and
pro-police, this has a significant detrimental effect on society. Not only does it
impact adversely on the administration of justice, but also it carries with it
significant social and economic consequences including potential resort to the
unfortunate practice of instant justice by the frustrated public (Hatchard and Ndulo,
1994:94).
Yet in many African countries, the magistracy faces serious difficulties. Firstly,
continuing the colonial practice of retaining magistrates as public servants can
lead to their politicization. To counter this, the trend towards bringing magistrates
under the auspices of the JSC should become the norm.28 Secondly, magistrates
often face considerable operational problems including serious structural and
resource limitations.29 Thirdly, magistrates often experience poor conditions of
service. These constraints, combined with isolation from a supportive legal
community, can lead to poor morale and performance. Here the only real solution
is for states to provide magistrates with facilities and support comparable to that
given to other judges. Addressing such issues will inevitably take time and
resources but the goal must be to ensure that magistrates enjoy, as far as
possible, comparable training and conditions of service as judges do in the higher
courts. 
8. Towards a Fully Representative Judiciary
Upholding the judicial oath of office to administer justice to all persons represents
a considerable challenge for judges who are inevitably the product of their social
conditioning, education, gender and ethnicity. If they are to discharge fully their
judicial oaths and to enjoy the broad confidence of the people, they must be drawn
from a wide array of different backgrounds to ensure a better understanding of
the experiences of those with whom they will be dealing.30 The need to maintain
Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: 
From a Justice System to a Just System
12
zambia journal edition 3_Layout 1  19/11/2012  20:43  Page 12
a gender balance within the judiciary is now widely recognized.31 As Cartwright
notes:
It goes without saying that women start with a better understanding
of women’s lives because that is our conditioning. It does not mean
that women judges are biased in favour of women . . . but because
gender means assumptions about men and women . . . it is essential
for one half of the population to have one half of the judiciary
understand something of their lives while the other half strive to learn
more about them (Cartwright, 1998: 45).
Although Zambia now has a fair number of women judges in the judiciary, the
numbers remain disappointingly low with very few women sitting in apex courts.
The position is particularly serious at the local court level where the indications are
that women are grossly under-represented, despite the fact that no formal
professional qualifications are required for appointment as a justice in the local
courts and that the majority of cases involve the family and domestic relations.32
Encouraging equality requires states to identify and tackle the factors that inhibit
the entry of women onto the bench. For example, certain judicial policies and
practices – such as the duty to go on circuit or be posted away from the home area
– disproportionately impede women from serving as judges given that women are
still typically the primary caregivers to children. 
The “fast-tracking” of appropriate candidates is necessary to correct
imbalance, although this should not be at the expense of applying less rigorous
qualification requirements on either gender, for the principle that judicial
appointment are made on merit is inviolable. Arguably, the appropriate approach
to redressing imbalances is for all levels of the judiciary to have, as an objective,
a selection system based on “merit with bias.” In other words, where two
candidates are of equal merit, the bias should be to appoint a woman or member
of an under-represented minority.  
9. Financial Autonomy of the Judiciary
Another area that has a great impact on the independence of the judiciary is the
approach taken to funding the judiciary. Sufficient funding to enable the judiciary
to perform its functions to the highest standards should be provided. Appropriate
salaries, supporting staff, resources and equipment are essential to the proper
functioning of the judiciary. As a matter of principle, judicial salaries and benefits
should be set by an independent commission. The salaries and benefits should be
secured by law. The administration of monies allocated to the judiciary should be
under the control of the judiciary. Moreover, financial autonomy is fundamental.
Without it, the executive can seriously impinge upon judicial independence by
limiting the judiciary’s access to funds voted to it by Parliament and/or by assuming
control of the services and staff upon which the judiciary depends. Providing
budgetary independence enables the judiciary to control its own funds and to
make use of them according to its own priorities.33 This is not the case in many
African countries where the judiciary is required to go “cap in hand” to the relevant
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government ministry with a request for funds. This results in the executive as sole
decision maker regarding whether the judiciary is granted any or all of the funds
requested — and, without proper checks, the executive is left to exercise such
discretion according to its own policy or priorities or Presidential dictates.
10. Maintaining the status of the judiciary
Judicial independence and judicial accountability are closely related.  A society
must support and protect the judiciary for, as the Zimbabwe crisis demonstrates,
judges remain an easy target for those wishing to make partisan political capital.
In return, society can expect judges to accept fair and temperate criticism of
judgements and to maintain appropriate standards of ethical behaviour. The
preamble to the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct states that public
confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the
judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society. 
To help retain the sensitive balance between independence and
accountability, several African states have developed codes of judicial ethics.
These are an extremely desirable means of establishing the parameters for public
expectations and criticism of judicial conduct. The method of creation of such
codes varies. Providing a statutory code, as in the case of Zambia, raises concern
that the legislature or Minister may have too much input into determining the
appropriate conduct for judges. In any event, a statutory code is arguably
inappropriate in that ethical rules are seldom absolute and it is preferable to set
out standards of conduct rather than to lay down legally enforceable rules. This in
some countries has led to the development of codes by members of the judiciary
themselves.34 These have the advantage of ensuring that the code has judicial
support although, of course, it runs the risk of being viewed from the outside as
being a self-serving document. Given its potential relevance to so many, the
development of a code is best undertaken as a result of a co-operative effort on
the part of judges, the legal profession, legal academics and civil society,35
preferably based on internationally agreed standards.36
Ideally, such a code should deal with both the exercise of judicial duties and
extra-judicial activities and, in particular, require judges to disclose their assets:
This is essential to guard against potential corruption. Whilst many lay down rules
that are seemingly straightforward and obvious to lawyers, they provide the public
with a clear statement as to what they can expect from their judges. It is extremely
useful, for example, to know that judges who cause undue delay in the hearing of
cases, or serve in a politically sensitive capacity are justifiably open to public
criticism. The effectiveness of such codes largely depends upon their wide public
dissemination, and much more effort is required in this respect.37
In most jurisdictions, curiously, there is rarely any formal procedure for the
taking of disciplinary action for any breach of the code of ethics where the
complaint does not involve the possibility of removal from the bench. Such matters
are usually dealt with as an internal matter by the Chief Justice, with no public
admonition of the judge. This is not adequate. To maintain public confidence it is
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necessary to develop an effective method of upholding judicial accountability as
well as offering appropriate protection for judges against unfounded criticism. A
suitable approach is the establishment of an independent Judicial Ombudsman to
serve as the link between the judges and the public. This might be a separate
institution or an additional responsibility given to the JSC. For example, in Uganda
the JSC is mandated to receive recommendations and complaints concerning the
judiciary and the administration of justice from members of the public, and to
investigate complaints and to take ‘appropriate action’ in collaboration with the
judiciary. This is useful so far as it goes, but a serious shortcoming is the lack of
a requirement to make public the results of its enquiries. There is a need for
transparency in such matters and there is no reason why details of disciplinary
action against any judicial officer should not be made public. Transparency has the
added advantage of serving as a deterrent to other judges.
The relationship between Parliament and the judiciary remains a potentially
tense and acrimonious one. Paragraph I of the Executive Summary to the Latimer
House Guidelines emphasizes the need to apply the doctrine of ‘mutual restraint’:
Relations between Parliament and the judiciary should be governed
by respect for Parliament’s primary responsibility for the making of
legislation and for the judiciary’s role in interpreting legislation and in
ensuring its compatibility with the constitution. 
Experience has shown that the judicial role of interpreting legislation (as well
as the constitution) can bring the courts into conflict with both Parliament and the
executive and make it the subject of harsh and bitter criticism. Constitutional
adjudication is inherently controversial and political disputes inevitably enter the
judicial arena. Yet it is inimical to the rule of law if political pressure is directed
towards the judges by those who have not succeeded in the judicial adjudication
or who wish to influence future decisions. Parliamentarians and Ministers, like
everyone else, must accept court decisions until they are either overturned by a
superior court or through a constitutionally authorized process. They are entitled
to criticize a ruling but what is never acceptable is the making of vague allegations
of improper motives for decisions, personal attacks on the integrity of individual
judges or threats against their personal safety. 
The protection of judicial security of tenure means strictly limiting the grounds
for removal.39 Judges must enjoy security of tenure if they are to act independently
and serve as a check on government. Accordingly, there is serious cause for
concern when such removal can be for “any other cause.”40 Given that judges
and magistrates hold office during “good behaviour", invariably misbehaviour is a
ground for removal. Equally, removal for mental incapacity is unexceptional.
“Incompetence” is sometimes an additional ground for removal. This is a
somewhat vague concept but can perhaps be judged against the criteria for
judicial performance set out in the Judicial Code of Conduct.41
A transparent and independent removal procedure is essential. A fundamental
constitutional issue here concerns who has the right to initiate such proceedings.
Whilst any person or body is entitled to call for removal, arguably the initiation is
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best left to an independent JSC (or Judicial Ombudsman) or the Chief Justice. If
left in the hands of the President, Cabinet or Parliament, it provides a potential
weapon through which to intimidate judges and thus help create or maintain a
pliant judiciary. In effect, it undermines the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary.
11. Effectiveness of the Judiciary and the Rule of law
In every country a national constitution articulates the vision of the society; defines
the fundamental principles by which the country is organized, distributes power
within the country; and plays an important role in national building and
consolidating the nation state. As earlier observed, the idea of constitutionalism
and good governance connotes a government defined, regulated and limited by
a constitution. Constitutional democracy is founded upon the notion of checks and
balances, namely the judiciary and the executive, while operating independently
of one another, act to check each other’s operations and balance each other’s
power. The commitment to principles and enactment of constitutional provisions
that provide for checks and balances alone cannot guarantee adherence to those
provisions. Institutional effectiveness and accountability are central to good
governance and the rule of law. It requires independent, functional and credible
courts in order to translate constitutional provisions and principles into practice
and into meaningful checks on government.  
In most African states it is widely acknowledged that the performance of the
judiciary is hampered by the shortage of both human and operational resources
availability. Typically courts are congested and are perceived as slow in their
disposal of cases or complaints that are brought before them. The courts operate
without computers, stenographers or even adequate stationery. Libraries are
outdated and inadequate. In some jurisdictions, hundreds of judgements remain
unenforced. In yet some countries, scores of cases remain undecided in
instances where it appears that the political costs of deciding the cases would be
too high.  
Another major area of deficiency in the African judicial system is lack of
access to courts, and corruption. Access to justice in Africa is notoriously
hampered by delays in trials in the law courts. The legal system is not perceived
by many as protecting the rights of all citizens equally and effectively. The poor and
marginalized groups in society have generally received poor protection from the
law. The general perception is that education and economic status play a major
role in one’s ability to access justice. These difficulties tend to undermine the
public’s confidence in the ability and suitability of the courts to act as a check on
the executive and as forums for the protection of human rights and the
advancement of the rule of law. Further, corruption completely undermines the
legitimacy of the judiciary. It leads people to regard courts as an inappropriate
forum for the resolution of disputes and protection of human rights. The challenge
for national institutions is to develop mechanisms that not only improve the
functioning of the courts, but facilitate accessibility.  
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12. Criticizing the Courts and Contempt of Court 
Judges administer criticism of each other through appeal decisions and they do
this publicly. The debate in Zambia has centred on whether members of the public
have a right to criticize courts. Legitimate criticism of judges arising from the
discharge of their duties, even if somewhat emphatic and unhappily expressed, is
permissible as being the exercise of the freedom of expression.42 Law teachers
in their writings must likewise feel unencumbered in exposing flawed judgments,
although this must never extend to personal attacks on judges. If the judiciary is
to remain healthy, vigorously autonomous and able to perform its constitutional
functions without improper influences, it must be immune to attacks that seek to
influence judicial decisions making. Unjustified, uninformed, and unreasonable
attacks on judicial integrity strike at the judiciary’s constitutional role and must be
condemned. In extreme cases, a court may cite its critics for contempt of court.43
Since the media is often the only means by which Zambians learn about the
judiciary, the media bears extraordinary power to affect public perception, and
thereby to affect the judiciary itself. The media bears a collective responsibility to
ensure that issues affecting the judiciary are covered fully, fairly and accurately.
Reporting about the judiciary accurately and fairly requires journalists to keep
judicial independence in mind when producing a court related story. An inaccurate
or out of context story can misinform an enormous segment of the population and
can simultaneously generate a backlash against the case, the law or the judge
involved or against the judiciary as a whole.
Unfortunately, however, courts in Zambia appear to regard any comment on
a matter before the courts as contempt of court. This practice is rooted in an
outdated interpretation of the contempt of court under the common law, and is an
approach that has been rejected by courts in other common law jurisdictions
around the world. The current international approach has been influenced by the
increasing appreciation of the importance of free speech in a democracy. Courts
in Africa need to learn that it is better to be respected than feared. The right to
criticize judges and their judgments is an integral part of a good system of the
administration of justice. If honest and fair criticism is considered contempt, that
takes away the very foundation of a democratic society – free speech. Justice
Black of the United States Supreme Court, outlining the underlying justification
for the protection of free speech in the American constitution, observed in New
York v. Times Company that “the press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press
can effectively expose deception in government.”44 The Chief Justice
Gajendragadkar of the Indian Supreme Court has observed: “We ought never to
forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be
exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate
use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status
of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise judges never forget that
the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect
from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness
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and objectivity of their approach, and by restraint, dignity and decorum which they
observe in their judicial conduct.”45
What the legal profession should detest – indeed, what any civilized society
should detest -- are vile abuses and the derision of judges, baseless accusations
of impropriety, corruption, and interference with witnesses.  As the Indian Supreme
Court observed in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others: “We
wish to emphasize that under the cover of the freedom of speech and expression
no party can be given a license to misrepresent the proceedings and orders of
the court and deliberately paint an absolute wrong and incomplete picture which
has the tendency to scandalize the court and bring it into disrepute or ridicule.”46
The right to criticize the courts is an integral part of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. The criminal justice system should not be used to
intimidate people who in good faith criticize the courts and seek to promote the
accountability of the judiciary.
As the leading English Judge Lord Aitkin observed a long time ago in Ambard
v. Attorney-General (Trinidad and Tobago):
But where the authority and position of an individual judge or the due
administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any
member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in
good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice.
The path of criticism is a public way. Justice is not a cloistered virtue:
she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though
outspoken comments of ordinary men.47
As to the view that comments will allegedly interfere with the work of the court,
in trials that are by judge alone, (which is the case in most countries of the world),
as the Nigerian Court of Appeal observed in Attorney General v. Anambra State48
it is proper to assume that a judge, as a professional lawyer, will not be improperly
influenced in any way.49 As South African courts have observed, there are broader
values that deserve protection. The South African constitutional Judge, Justice
Krigler observed in the State v. Russell Mamabolo.50 “free and frank debate about
judicial proceedings serves more than one vital purpose. Self-evidently such
informed and vocal public scrutiny provides impartiality, accessibility and
effectiveness.”51 It constitutes a democratic check on the judiciary. In the same
case, Judge Abbie Sachs, observed: “indeed, bruising criticism could in many
circumstances lead to improvement in the administration of justice. Conversely,
the chilling effect of fear of prosecution for criticizing the courts might be conducive
to its deterioration.52
13. The Legal Profession
Thus far I have focused my remarks on the judiciary.  It would be wrong to end
there. The judicial system includes the wider legal profession. I do not think that
whatever is wrong with our judicial system can be the fault of the judges alone. The
legal profession and indeed the law schools bear equal blame, and they comprise
part of both the problem and the solution. The incompetence, delays, judge
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shopping and many other issues discussed in this article cannot happen without
the participation of members of the legal profession. Lawyers have an obligation
to provide professional service to the courts and their clients to the best of their
abilities.  
According to the United Nations’ Basic Principles, the basic obligations of a
lawyer include the following: (a) advising clients as to their legal rights and
obligations, and as to the working of the legal system in so far as it is relevant to
the legal rights and obligations of the clients; (b) assisting clients in every
appropriate way, and taking legal action to protect their interests; (c) assisting
clients before courts, tribunals or administrative authorities, where appropriate.53
As with other individuals with public responsibilities, lawyers must conduct
themselves according to ethical standards. The codes governing lawyers must
include clear norms of behaviour and the possibility of lawyers to be held
accountable in case of misconduct. Complaints against lawyers must be
processed expeditiously. For lawyers to discharge their responsibilities they, like
the judges, need to be well trained. 
The mushrooming of law schools in Zambia with low admission standards,
inadequate libraries and inadequately trained teachers can only but pose a serious
risk to the high standards demanded of the legal profession. It seems to me that
its most likely contribution to law practice is the institutionalization of mediocrity in
the practice of law. The problem is that Zambia has adopted the United States’
approach to allowing the establishment of private universities without instituting the
American controls such as the accreditation system to ensure that universities
are centres of intellectual adventures and discovery, and places where students
of a subject are prepared by competent teachers. As a result, we have law schools
staffed by inadequately prepared law teachers producing large numbers of half-
baked graduates. Urgent action to reverse this trend is needed.
14. The Way Forward
Having discussed judicial reform and challenges facing the judiciary and the legal
profession, I should sum up by discussing the way forward. Assuming that all
stakeholders agree on the need for judicial reform, the biggest challenge facing the
country is going to be figuring out where we go from here. How to proceed is a
question that must be addressed carefully and intelligently. This requires us to
answer questions such as: What sort of provisions do we want to have in the new
constitution to advance the independence, competence and integrity of the
judiciary? What do we do to correct and transcend the deficiencies of the past so
that our courts can come to enjoy the confidence of the public and become a
central element in our democratic society? As we plot the future, we must
recognize that while there are bad apples in the judiciary, there are many men
and women who have served with competence and distinction. The good judges
deserve respect and to be retained in the judiciary. 
Kenya provides one approach to reform. The 2010 Kenyan constitution
required all judges to step down and reapply for their positions. A vetting
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committee was established to ascertain the competence and integrity of the
judges. The vetting Committee is composed of Kenyan and international judges.
The international judges include Justice Albie Sachs of South Africa, Justice
Fredrick Chomba of Zambia and Chief Justice Georgina Woods of Ghana. Among
other things they review the judges’ judgements. Whether this is what should
happen in Zambia is up to Zambians to decide. The biggest challenge is going to
be how to ensure that the process is not politicized or hijacked by political
opportunists with their own agendas. 
If we emulate the Kenyan process we must emulate both its substance and
its form – and resist the temptation to adopt its form without its substance. This
requires a good understanding of the Kenyan process and how it is being
implemented. The Kenyan process is transparent. Its modalities are structured
around objectives, processes and values identified by the 2010 constitution. The
Review Board is functioning carefully and appropriately within these specific
constitutional and statutory parameters. The Board’s role is not to carry out a
purge but to conduct a vetting process. As the Board has observed, a purge would
involve automatic exclusion based purely on actual or presumed membership of
an identified group.54 The vetting procedure, on the other hand, is founded on the
rule of law involving the assessment of an individual’s responsibility in the light of
an overall evaluation of the extent to which the conduct at issue is compatible with
the criteria established by the constitution. The Board has warned that
determinations of suitability cannot be made in a preordained or mechanical
manner. We must be mindful of the fact that many litigants who lose a case are
convinced that the court could only have gone against them because of bias or
corruption. As the Chief Justice of Kenya, Willy Mutunga, noted in remarks to the
members of the vetting Board: “The unparalleled exercise your Board has been
tasked with is both delicate and difficult, but it is not for purposes of mere ritual or
spectacle. It fulfills a requirement of the constitution as a first step towards realizing
the national aspiration of a transformed society. It is an exercise that is
unprecedented in the Commonwealth – one that requires a delicate balance of
high-level professionalism and deep sensitivity to both the judicial officials whose
record your Board continues to examine, as well as the public that has exceedingly
high expectations of those who would sit in judgment over its affairs.”55 In deciding
the way forward for Zambia, we must likewise strike a “delicate balance” to
thoughtfully develop a comprehensive, transparent and workable reform process
that duly emulates the integrity, independence and effectiveness that we wish to
characterize our judiciary and all branches of government.   
15. Conclusion
I would like to conclude my remarks by going back to where I started. Although the
Zambian public is not always clear as to how to achieve judicial reform, its thirst
for quality, accessible and affordable justice is loud and clear -- and it is our duty
to provide it. As we embark on this journey, I want to once again emphasize the
importance of the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law and the separation
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of powers in a democratic society. These are principles that should never be
compromised. An independent judiciary is central to the protection of human
rights, promotion of good governance and as a check on executive abuses. It is
an essential check and balance on other branches of the government, and in
ensuring that laws of the legislature and acts of the executive comply with the
constitution. Only a truly independent judiciary, free of pressure from and
indebtedness to political parties, public officials, interest groups, and popular whim
can be truly accountable to the public it serves. The judiciary can be effective only
if it is run by competent, upright and courageous men and women. 
I would like to conclude with a piece of advice which is directed at those who
wish to join the judiciary. It is taken from the Ecclesiasticus in the Apocrypha. A
long time ago, Jesus the Son of Sirach said (as recorded in Ecclesiasticus in
Chapter, 7, verse 6): “Do not aspire to be a judge, unless you have the strength
to put an end to influence; for you may be intimidated by a man of rank and so
compromise your integrity.” This piece of advice was given over 3,000 years ago.
It is as sound today as it was at the time it was given. 
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25 In the case of Zambia, the relevant Parliamentary Committee considered that security
clearance of candidates was its prime task.
26 Cf. Kenya where the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1988 repealed the security of
tenure provisions in the 1962 constitution. This blatant attempt to make judges serve at the
whim of the President provoked considerable internal and external criticism and led to a
1990 constitutional amendment that substantially resorted to the pre-1988 position: see
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1990. See also G.K. Kuria and A.M. Vaquez,
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‘Judges and Human Rights: the Kenyan Experience’ (1991) 35 Journal of African Law 142,
at pp. 145-6.
27 See paragraph 24 of Judicial Ethics in South Africa. The ‘code’ was issued in March 2000
by the Chief Justice and other senior judges. See also E. Kahn, ‘Extra-judicial Activities of
Judges’ (1980) De Jure 188. Widner notes that Chief Justice Nyalali ‘agonized’ as to whether
to accept President Mwinyi’s request to chair the commission on the future of the one-party
state in Tanzania precisely because he feared it might adversely affect the independence of
the judiciary: J. Widner, Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial
Independence in Africa, Norton and Company, New York, 2001, pp. 293-4.
28 A good approach is that in Malawi where magistrates are appointed by the Chief Justice on
the recommendation of the JSC and hold office until the age of seventy. See s.111 (3)
Constitution of Malawi.
29 These extend to such basic items as run down buildings, no lockable cupboards to store
records and evidence securely, lack of reference materials and inadequate security for
personnel buildings.
30 See, for example, paragraph 7 of the Bloemfontein Statement of 1993: ‘. . . it is fundamental
to a country’s judiciary to enjoy the broad confidence of the people it serves: to the extent
possible, a judiciary should be broad-based and therefore not appear (rightly or wrongly)
beholden to the interest of any particular section of society’.
31 One of the Principles enshrined in the Latimer House Guidelines states: ‘It is recognized
that redress of gender imbalance is essential to accomplish full and equal rights in society
and to achieve true human rights. Merit and the capacity to perform public office regardless
of disability should be the criteria of eligibility for appointment’. The UN Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary state that in the selection of judges there shall be no
discrimination against a person on ground of sex (para 10).
32 For example, a report on Zambia found that there were only sixteen female local-court
justices out of a total of 907 (1.6 percent). See ‘The Dilemma of Local Courts in Zambia’
Report of the Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development, 1998,
http://afronet.org.3a/reports/Lcourts.htm.
33 Ideally a constitution should also provide for a judiciary that is self-accounting. See, for
example, s.118 (3) Constitution of Lesotho. 
34 The Latimer House Guidelines call for the development and adoption by each judiciary of a
code. Such codes exist in Tanzania, Namibia and South Africa.
36 A suitable body for drafting, revising and overseeing the working of the code is therefore a
fully representative JSC.
37 See, for example, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct which was drawn up by the
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity in February 2001 and whose drafting
Committee included senior judges from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. The Code
highlights six values: Propriety (propriety, and the appearance of propriety, is essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge); Independence; Integrity; Impartiality; Equality
(ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts); Competence and Diligence.
38 For example, ensuring a copy of the code in all the major languages is readily available to
all litigants.
39 Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial
Independence adopted on June 19, 1998, Guideline No. II.
40 Although there seems to be no bar to a President ‘re-assigning’ a serving judge, with their
consent, to another position within the public service. See for example, s.119 (7) Constitution
of Malawi. Whilst in the past this may have been necessary as a means of making the best
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use of scarce human resources, the provision now poses a potential threat to judicial
independence. Of course this does not apply to the secondment of a judge to a senior
international judicial posting, such as to the International Court of Justice.
41 E.g., s.87 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
42 See art. 144 Constitution of Uganda. A poor legal knowledge might perhaps fall into this
category. Kahn refers to several South African judges who were known amongst practitioners
as ‘Old Necessity’ because either ‘Necessity knows no law’ or ‘Necessity is the mother of
invention’ (see Kahn, Law, Life and Laughter, Juta, Cape Town, 1984, p. 15).
43 See, for example, Ogilvie Thompson C.J. in S. v. van Niekerk 1972 (3) SA 711 (A) at 720.
Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd., 1973 3 All E.R. 54 at p.60.
44 There are two modes of conduct that fall within the scope of criminal contempt. One is
contempt in the face of the court. The other is conduct calculated to bring a court, a judge or
the administration of justice through the courts generally into contempt. It is sufficient ‘if it is
a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as a whole, calculated to undermine the authority of the
courts and endanger public confidence, thereby obstructing and interfering with the
administration of justice. See Chokolingo v. A-G of Trinidad and Tobago [1981] 1 All ER 244
(PC) at 248’ per Gubbay C.J. In re Chinamasa [2001] 3 LRC 373 at p. 384.
45 403 U.S. 713, 1971.
46 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, (1919) 8SCC 308
47 Ibid.
48 Ambard v. Attorney General (Trinidad and Tobago) 1936 AC 322, 335
Akinrisola v. Attorney-General of Anambra State, (1980) 2 NC R 17
49. Ibid
50. (CCT 44/00) (2001) ZACC 17; 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC)
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba,
27 August to 7 September 1990.
54 Judges and Magistrates’ Vetting Board Restoring Public Confidence in the Judiciary, First
Report of the Kenya Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board, 30 March 2012(unpublished). 
55 Chief Justice Remarks at the Meeting with the Judges and Magistrates’ Vetting Board at the
Supreme Court Building on 30 April 2012 (unpublished).
56 The Book of Ecclesiasticus (also known as the Book of Siach) (http://www.catholicdoors.
Com/bible/ sirac.httm (last visited 15 June 2012)
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